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11.   Was securitisation the culprit? 
Explanation of legal processes 




The recent global credit crisis, the collapse of large investment and 
high street banks as well as the nationalisation of Northern Rock 
have established that misuse of innovative fi nancing techniques 
such as securitisation might pose an unacceptable level of risk for 
the global economy. The question is whether securitisation is the 
underlying causal element of the global credit crisis. Securitisation 
as a fi nancing technique has had a bad press of late.1 It has been seen 
as the culprit in the 2007/2008 fi nancial crisis. The complex nature 
of securitisation and other structured fi nance transactions needs to 
be understood, along with the fact that that their failure may lead to 
the Risk Originator’s failure.2 Thus, securitisation should be used 
extensively to fi nance businesses but with caution by people who are 
aware of the consequences and complexities inherent in this type of 
fi nancing.
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether securitisation is in fact 
the reason for the fi nancial crisis. The chapter analyses the signifi -
cance of securitisation as a fi nancing technique which is critical for 
raising capital. The recurrent theme is that there is a need for greater 
transparency and predictability in securitisation. It was the lack of 
transparency and ambiguous pricing of the sub-prime element of 
securitised credit risk that caused the crisis in interbank markets. 
International harmonisation activities on secured transactions may 
provide assistance for what would have been needed for collateral 
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debt obligations. Part two elaborates upon the legal technique of 
securitisation and will examine the relationship between the sub-
prime crisis and securitisation. Part three examines current problems 
experienced in the wholesale interbank markets surrounding the 
Northern Rock crisis. Concluding remarks will be in part four.
SECURITISATION AND SUB-PRIME 
MORTGAGE CRISIS
Securitisation
Securitisation is a critical fi nancing technique which ‘effi  ciently allo-
cates risk with capital [and] enables companies to access to capital 
markets directly’.3 Simply, in securitisation receivables are fi rstly 
pooled by the originator and then sold to an independent special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which funds the purchase of receivables 
by issuing securities that are secured on the receivables to capital 
market investors.4 Broadly there are three types of securitisation 
transactions. These are true sale securitisation, synthetic securitisa-
tion and whole business securitisation. True sale is the most common 
form of securitisation; conversely, synthetic securitisation lacks 
assignment, which diff erentiates it from the true sale securitisation. 
Whole business securitisation is also known as corporate securitisa-
tion and certain sections of a company’s income are ring fenced to be 
securitised to provide additional benefi t to securities holders.5
Securitised mortgage assets generate liquidity which then is repaid 
to buyers of mortgage securitisation. 6 The SPV by issuing bonds 
and notes to investors raises fi nance. Illiquid fi nancial assets, by 
being assigned to an SPV, ‘are converted into securities, to facilitate 
their sale and trade.’7 Assigned receivables are isolated from the 
credit risk of the originator and used to create asset or mortgage-
backed securities which are granted higher credit rating by the credit 
rating agencies. 8 In a securitisation transaction there is always an 
originator that sells the future receivables9 to be generated from 
non- marketable assets such as home mortgage loans, credit card or 
leasing receivables to a special purpose vehicle, which raises fi nance 
through issuing securities and these assets become marketable secu-
rities. 10 In a securitisation transaction there must be receivables 
that are securtisable. 11 Often, originators may come together and 
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sell their receivables to one SPV and by virtue of this they create a 
multi-party securitisation. 12 This is certainly benefi cial for small and 
medium-sized businesses, as originators, as they will not have to deal 
individually with the creation of and matters relevant to the SPV, but 
all of them will deal with and share the burden of creating an SPV. 
This will be a more aff ordable way of securitising their receivables.13 
Multi-party securitisation transactions also grant better protection 
to the investors. The rationale is that in the event of the bankruptcy 
of one originator in a multi-party securitisation, there will not be any 
adverse eff ect on the investors and the SPV.14
It is critical that the transfer is a true sale, otherwise in the event 
of the originator’s insolvency the transfer may be recharacterised as 
a charge (that is, a charge over the receivables granted by the origi-
nator to the SPV rather than an outright transfer). However, the 
consequence of recharacterisation as a charge may have detrimental 
eff ects. Firstly, if the originator transfers these receivables under 
a security agreement thus the originator still owns the receivables, 
the quality of receivables and their rating value will be negatively 
aff ected. This is because the bankruptcy of the originator will also 
aff ect the SPV and the status of the receivables15 and the creditors of 
the originator may have claims on these receivables. Firstly, a charge 
granted by a company must be registered under the Companies 
Act 2006 s. 860. Failure of registration will render the charge void 
against third parties (liquidator of the company, an administrator 
of the company and a creditor of the company).16 Put simply, the 
SPV as well as the investors will become unsecured creditors as a 
result of no registration. On the other hand, sale of receivables is 
not registrable under English law,17 whereas under Article 9 of the 
US Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC) security interests over 
receivables are registrable.18 Secondly, the rating agency’s rating, 
generally speaking, is made on the assumption that in the event of 
liquidation, the liquidator should not challenge that the transfer 
was voided or reversed on the grounds that receivables were trans-
ferred by way of security or by a disguised sale transaction.19 Thus 
the rating will not be high, which will aff ect the price of securities. 
Arguably, the registrability of true sale will allow other assignees 
to be able to discover the existence of the assignment of the same 
receivable. It can also assist the screening of borrowers by fi nancial 
intermediaries. Currently, securitisation reduces the incentives of 
fi nancial intermediaries’ ability to screen borrowers.20 The eff ect of 
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this can be felt especially in the sub-prime mortgage securitisations, 
where the fi nancial histories of borrowers have not been seriously 
considered in the rating of securities.
There are certain reasons for companies to securitise their receiva-
bles or assets. These receivables may include credit card, trade, mort-
gage and franchising receivables, oil and gas loans as well as leases 
of property or equipment such as aircraft. Firstly, securitisation is 
said to reduce the cost of credit. That is to say that when companies 
are fi nanced by virtue of bank credits they have to assume the bank’s 
charges, whereas securitisation is inexpensive and not rigid21 as it 
presents a direct fi nancing opportunity to the originator. Professor 
Schwarcz argues that ‘increasingly, corporate and consumer fi nanc-
ing is originated not from banks per se or from bank deposits but 
from securitization markets’ 22 thus establishing a process of ‘dis-
intermediation’ where eff ectively banks as intermediaries of funds 
are removed. Secondly, securitisation reduces ’mismatches between 
assets and liabilities and to manage balance sheets better.’23 Thirdly, 
securitisation provides competitive fi nancial support benefi ts for 
borrowers.24 Small and medium-sized businesses need securitisa-
tion to raise their capitals in order to continue their investments and 
growth. Finally, even when securitisation is used, an originator fi rm 
may wish to maintain contact with the debtors even though assign-
ment is made to the assignee (SPV). In other words, the originator 
may continue to collect the payments on behalf of the assignee and 
often in securitisation notice is not given to the debtors, arguably 
to protect the originator’s fi nancial reputation. However, in the 
absence of registration, notice will determine priority. Priority will 
depend on the date of notice25 and failure to give notice to the SPV 
will result in the SPV losing the priority position if the originator 
further assigns the same receivable.26
The independence of the SPV is particularly critical. The SPV 
must be bankruptcy remote in order not to be aff ected by the bank-
ruptcy of the originator. The idea is, mainly, to protect the investors 
who purchased the securities secured by receivables. The SPV should 
be separate from the originator’s corporate structure and have no 
legal or equitable relationship with it, such as between a parent and 
subsidiary. This is achieved through establishing a trust structure 
where the shares of an SPV are ‘held under the terms of a trust for 
the benefi t of charitable institutions’.27 Unless the SPV is bankruptcy 
remote, cost of securitisation may be higher and risks may be created 
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for investors. Rating agencies will be reluctant to rate the bonds at 
a higher rate and this will make the bonds less marketable. The SPV 
is a specially created company with a single purpose to raise capital 
for the originator company and ‘is often owned by charitable trus-
tees.’28 Banks and other fi nanciers establish these trusts, generally, 
in off -shore jurisdictions where trust law generally favours these 
fi nancing techniques and structures. 29 The bankruptcy remoteness 
will give confi dence to investors as they will ‘focus just on the value 
of the assets as security for their loan.’30 The SPV is not intended to 
be used for making money, but it only functions as a conduit pipe for 
payments between the originator and the investors of securities and 
bonds issued by the SPV. As SPVs are often established as charita-
ble trusts they are not for profi t and, in case of winding up, all cash 
raised through the sale of securities must match the mortgages being 
paid off , thus leaving no cash in the SPV account.31 Bankruptcy 
remoteness is also required for capital adequacy, tax and accounting 
purposes.32 Off -shore jurisdictions also off er favourable tax treat-
ment, which constitutes another reason for SPVs being established 
abroad.
Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis
The credit crisis, which takes its roots in the American sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, has arisen out of a number of interrelated fi nan-
cial, sociological and legal trends. These trends can be enumerated 
as fi rstly, the growth of wealth and its utilisation in investments 
whether or not in an eff ective way; secondly, the risk-taking strat-
egy of fi nancial sector and individuals; and thirdly, defi ciencies in 
the corporate governance and fi nancial supervision.33 Risk taking 
seems to be a particularly signifi cant factor because it involves risky 
business and lending decisions, which then leaves a narrow or no 
margin for errors. The lending practices in American sub-prime 
mortgage markets to borrowers with poor credit histories proved to 
be risky. Prior to the sub-prime crisis, with the competition among 
the mortgage lenders to extend as many mortgages as they could 
so that more commission could be earned, riskier investments were 
made. Sub-prime borrowers may not have sophisticated fi nancial 
information, which exposes them to predatory lending.34 As the fi rst 
step, borrowers purchased mortgages from brokers or banks with 
few fi nancial backgrounds checks. Arguably rising house prices was 
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the fundamental reason why banks lent to people with poor credit 
histories with the expectation that even if they defaulted in their 
payments there would still be the possibility to sell these houses and 
without banks having any actual losses. As the future income from 
these properties was securitised, clearly the strategy of banks was to 
sell and recover any monies before the maturity of these securities 
arising out of sub-prime mortgage securitisations. It is arguable that 
these are high-risk loans because there is no guarantee whether bor-
rowers with poor credit histories will be able to repay (typically the 
loans are several times higher than the personal income, such income 
often being unreliable and unverifi ed). These loans were gathered 
and sold to investment fi rms and SPVs. These loans and collater-
alised debt obligations were sold to investors not just in the United 
States but around the globe. Conversely, rating agencies rather 
traditionally have given high ratings to mortgage-backed securities 
because the default rate on those rates were traditionally lower than 
the asset-backed securities. Moreover, the underwriting standards 
in those types of assets were diff erent than the normal securitisation 
practices.35 However, arguably, one thing is miscalculated. That is 
the mortgage-backed securities in this crisis were in fact not derived 
from prime mortgages but from sub-prime mortgages, where the 
mortgage holder does not have the same fi nancial standing as the 
prime mortgage holder. The more sub-prime mortgage loans were 
securitised, the bigger the so called mortgage bubble got. However, 
as the stability of the mortgage market is dependent upon the income 
of mortgage holders and the rest of the economy as a whole, with 
the fall of house prices (partly the result of oversupply in the US), 
the increase of interest rates and default of mortgage holders who 
compromised borrowers in what is now termed the sub-prime market 
who could not keep up with the payments, the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis unfolded. Those mortgage holders typically with very low 
income or with negative credit histories did not have refi nancing 
options. 36 The depreciation of housing prices and the default in 
repayment of mortgages deterred fi nanciers and investment com-
panies from buying further mortgage-backed securities as these 
 products lost their stability.
However as the sub-prime mortgage crisis itself developed, the 
broader fi nancial outlook began to seem more dismal. The break-
ing point, arguably, converting the sub-prime mortgage crisis into a 
global fi nancial crisis related to the maturity of securities which had 
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been left unpaid. When the mortgage-backed securities matured, 
investors in these securities could not sell their securities due to 
mortgage borrowers’ default, whose payment fi nances the mortgage-
backed securities. Lack of liquidity led to banks being reluctant to 
lend to each other and particularly, due to suspension of inter-bank 
lending, smaller banks experienced liquidity problems and as they 
frequently borrow from larger banks, they were under fi nancial dis-
tress. This is particularly true for building societies that did not have 
the same scale of deposit base as high street banks, and also true of 
banks (such as Northern Rock) that relied on short-term borrowing 
from larger banks and other fi nancial institutions to fi nance their 
mortgage lending business to a greater extent that they relied on a 
longer-term deposit base.
The exposure of a number of issues by the credit crisis such as the 
interrelation of the banking system, capital markets and payment 
systems and transparency of the securitisation market require par-
ticular attention. 37 Firstly, globalisation of fi nancial markets has 
not been accompanied by an attendant globalisation of legal cer-
tainty relating to fi nancial market transactions. The misuse of the 
securitisation technique and fi nancial markets’ failure to foresee the 
approach of the crisis caused problems both for banks and small 
and medium-sized businesses that need access to low-cost credit. 
During that process banks had to repossess assets and particularly, 
the properties that were mortgaged but unpaid and register ‘back on 
their books; backstop lines of credit were triggered; and banks could 
no longer securitize loans, increasing the pressure on their balance 
sheets.’38 Lack of ability to securitise loans increased the cost of 
credit and reduced availability of credit. The increased cost of credit 
had a negative impact on the small and medium-sized enterprises 
that need low-cost credit to expand business and, in general, eco-
nomic growth was hampered when the asset values declined and the 
global economy has become fragile more than ever. Secondly, the 
transparency issue has proved to be a signifi cant element in the crisis. 
As securitisation has an extremely complex and technical structure 
and involves certain risks, there must be transparency in the way 
the quality of loans and the relevant risks are disclosed to investors. 
Professor Schwarcz argues that despite the disclosure about the risks 
involved in mortgage-backed securities, the disclosure proved to be 
insuffi  cient and the complex nature of securitisation as well as the 
length of documentation in the off ering of these securities has had 
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an impact on the insuffi  ciency of information in this market.39 It is 
indicated that lack of transparency has occurred in diff erent levels 
and dimensions of securitisation. These include valuation, pricing 
and concentration of risk.40 The complexity of valuation of securi-
tised assets, obligations and collateralised debt obligations as well as 
the lack of pricing information of mortgage-backed securities, which 
is caused by lack of transparency, has led to uncertainty and loss of 
confi dence.41 The complex nature of mortgage-backed securitisation 
has led to the insuffi  ciency of disclosure as investors were not certain 
in relation to the value of the securities that they have invested on. 
The insuffi  ciency of disclosure and the complexity of securitisation 
transactions exposed investors to risk. This is also called the ‘con-
centration of risk’ according to which lack of detailed reporting of 
exposures caused the market participants to be non-informed of the 
risks, which then ‘led to a reluctance to engage with counterparties 
[and] pushed up spreads and reduced liquidity further.’42 The lack 
of suffi  cient liquidity is the fundamental problem which derived 
from securities’ loss of market value, which led fewer buyers to pur-
chase these securities. Thus the fi nancial institutions holding these 
securities were left with securities which could not be sold and they 
became insolvent not in the traditional sense, but as they cannot pay 
the matured securities due to their lack of liquidity (which may also 
be termed as liquidity squeeze), they had to choose the bankruptcy 
option.43
Following the credit crisis of 2007/2008, investment banks have 
invented certain new fi nancing schemes to reduce the capital cost of 
risky assets on banks’ balance sheets. This type of scheme is often 
called ‘smart securitisation’ or rather misleadingly ‘insurance’.44 
Although the scheme is similar to the traditional securitisation there 
appear to be some diff erences. Firstly, under traditional securitisa-
tion there is new lending whereas smart securitisation involves the 
securitisation of existing risky assets on the balance sheets of banks 
rather than involving the discredited collateralised debt obliga-
tions; and secondly, smart securitisation scheme does not disguise 
the transfer of risk.45 This new scheme, in eff ect, aims to reduce the 
capital requirements of banks that need to be held against the assets 
by reducing the cost of risky assets on the capital. However, this 
seems to go against the idea of strengthening bank capital.46 The 
scheme also seems to be another excellent example of how a fi nanc-
ing technique may still be misused despite the recent fi nancial crisis.
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NORTHERN ROCK, GRANITE, 
SECURITISATION AND CRISIS
Northern Rock was a bank that specialised in domestic mortgage 
lending. It also operated as a traditional high street bank. However, 
the growth of Northern Rock was due to the size of its loan portfolio 
from its securitisation practice rather than its high street banking 
practices, where competitively priced mortgages were extended. 
Northern Rock operated its securitisation scheme through its SPV, 
a charitable trust, Granite Finance Trustees Limited. Granite was 
established in 1999 as an off -shore company in Jersey. As it was a 
charitable trust and separate from the structure of the Northern 
Rock, it had not been aff ected by the nationalisation of its origina-
tor; Northern Rock over the years had transferred some portions 
of mortgages to Granite. These transferred mortgages were worth 
approximately ‘67% of the value of the properties they are secured 
against.’47 Generally speaking, the competitiveness of Northern 
Rock in the market was sustained through borrowing from lenders 
and other banks both from the UK and international markets. 
These funds were used to provide mortgages to borrowers which 
were then securitised in the fi nancial markets. Arguably, one of the 
elements in Northern Rock’s failure was entering into sub-prime 
mortgage securitisation arrangements and its aggressive securitisa-
tion strategy. In 2006, Northern Rock began lending to sub-prime 
borrowers and Lehman Brothers assessed the borrowers’ risk and 
creditworthiness and in the summer of 2007 the interest rates on 
those sub-prime mortgages were increased.48 Following the depre-
ciation of US house prices, which triggered the sub-prime mortgage 
crises, investor demand for sub-prime mortgage securities decreased. 
Defaults occurred in the payment of mortgage-backed securities 
upon their maturity, the payment of which depended on the bor-
rowers’ fi nancial standing, Northern Rock was led to default in 
repayments to its lenders. Arguably, Northern Rock’s operation was 
similar to predatory lending in relation to sub-prime mortgages and 
the bank had an information advantage over the securities arranger 
about the borrower’s fi nancial standing. In that context, it could be 
argued that Northern Rock was also involved in predatory borrow-
ing and lending practices. In this latter scenario, normally the origi-
nator makes representation and warranties so that the underwriting 
process can be completed.49 Following the default in repayment 
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to lenders, Northern Rock approached the Bank of England to 
borrow money in order to continue to meet its day-to-day business 
funding requirements, which led to a depositor run on the bank.50 
As a fi nal resort Northern Rock was nationalised.51 It is arguable 
that behind the nationalisation decision lay the complex nature of 
the securitisation relationship between Northern Rock and its SPV, 
Granite. Granite held the 40 per cent of Northern Rock’s assets52 
and was supplied regularly with securitised mortgages when the 
old mortgages were matured and paid out; however, this led to the 
inapplicability of insolvency administration appointment procedure 
because of the fear that investors might have demanded the payment 
of the amount held in Granite, hence nationalisation rather than 
insolvency of Northern Rock.53
The relationship between Northern Rock and Granite has sig-
nifi cance in the period leading to nationalisation. Northern Rock 
employed a risky and aggressive securitisation model often called 
originate and distribute model (or O & D) and this was the key to 
the fi nancing of its business and lay behind its spectacular growth 
up until 2007. According to this model loans of poor quality are not 
held to maturity but bundled and packaged extensively and sold to 
investors by Granite. Some of the problems originating from this 
O& D model can be summarised as piling up of large quantities of 
super senior tranches of securitisation deals in the bank’s books, 
which have been kept to minimise underwriting costs. This in turn 
gave misleading signals as to the exact status of liquidity of banks, as 
the distribution was not quick enough and this increased the inven-
tory risk of the bank.54 Empirical data showed that with lack of 
screening incentives (that is, the more the distance between the origi-
nators and investors, the less the possibility to screen originators and 
conduct healthy due diligence-monitoring and assessing credit risks) 
combined with a risk taking tendency, this model proved to be a 
major contributor to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.55 Furthermore, 
the risk was also that originators could not properly assess the risks 
involved in the assets and due diligence could not be made. Investors 
also could not perform a careful due diligence as a result of limited 
information in this market. Thus, investors would depend on the 
ratings provided by the credit rating agencies.56 However, cr edit 
rating agencies in the past have been misled purposefully or know-
ingly by originators and SPVs during the Enron scandal, where 
risky assets were kept off  balance sheets and in the SPVs books. This 
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distorted credit rating agencies’ ratings and abusive and manipula-
tive behaviour occurred.57 A further signifi cant aspect of Northern 
Rock and Granite relationship, which seems to be standard in 
every originator-SPV relationship,58 arises out of the ambiguity in 
the risks associated with off -balance sheet vehicles. Granite was an 
off -balance sheet vehicle that purchased loans generated from the 
bank’s O & D model. These have contributed to the crisis by smoke 
screening the real nature of the liquidity problems they have. It has 
been pointed out that:
[t]he issue of off -balance sheet funding has emerged as an important issue 
because, during the recent market turbulence, contractual obligations 
of banks to off -balance sheet vehicles in the form of contingent liquid-
ity facilities, or even non-contractual reputational considerations, has 
required banks to provide funding for and/or reabsorb the assets backing 
these structures at a time of severe stress in the market.59
Thus the House of Commons Treasury Committee indicated that 
the Financial Services Authority ‘must ensure that banks report their 
exposure to off -balance sheet vehicles appropriately.’60 Arguably 
the more transparency achieved in this area, the more predictable the 
fi nancial standings of Banks will be.
CONCLUSIONS
The lack of access to credit by small banks as well as small and 
medium-sized enterprises caused by the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
has often diff erent dimensions such as recession, loss of jobs, repos-
session of properties as well as bankruptcies of large and prominent 
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers or nationalisation of 
banks such as Northern Rock and Bear Stearns. In that context, 
securitisation is critical in raising fi nance.
The title of this chapter poses the question as to whether securiti-
sation is the true culprit of the past few years, but it is argued here 
that it is not. Rather it is capable of being a clear and effi  cient fi nanc-
ing mechanism. It is also clear that the reckless business strategy 
employed within the last 10 years by Northern Rock to the detri-
ment of the resilience of its liquidity position61 demonstrates the fact 
that securitisation as a sophisticated fi nancing technique is not in 
itself the culprit. Like many sophisticated fi nancing techniques it is 
GRAY PRINT.indd   11 15/04/2011   11:21
12 Financial regulation in crisis?
complex, as it involves both fi nancial and legal technicality and lacks 
transparency for the investor and borrower. The fi nancing technique 
involves heavy human input in the decision making, lending, bor-
rowing, underwriting and investment processes. The transparency of 
the relationship between the originator, SPV, investor, rating agen-
cies and debtors will determine the quality of transaction and fi nanc-
ing. This process involves moral hazard and human error. In relation 
to human errors and the human factor in the crisis, the House of 
Commons Treasury Committee summarised the  participation of 
directors as follows:
The directors of Northern Rock were the principal authors of the diffi  cul-
ties that the company has faced since August 2007. The directors pursued 
a reckless business model, which was excessively reliant on wholesale 
funding. The Financial Services Authority systematically failed in its 
regulatory duty to ensure that Northern Rock would not pose a systemic 
risk.62
The fact that securitisation involves risks and encourages risky 
lending practices should not deter investors. Credibility with inves-
tors must be rebuilt in order to benefi t from the advantages of 
securitisation by being more transparent, explaining the risks inher-
ent in the process including the quality of the assets and the con-
tractual structure and by improving the banking risk management 
structures.63 Nevertheless, transparency should be maintained and 
promoted in order to ensure that relevant due diligence is conducted 
by investors to have fuller information on the complex nature of the 
transaction as well as risks involved.64 However, it should be noted 
that reliance on the ratings given to these types of products by the 
rating agencies without due diligence and the desire to have more 
commission in the competition atmosphere without considering the 
risks involved in a volatile market should be blamed. The default or 
the downgrading of credit ratings of mortgage backed securities or 
other obligations caused investors to lose their confi dence in fi nan-
cial markets. This is because their collateralised debt obligations, 
mortgage-backed securities or asset-backed securities were highly 
rated by rating agencies.65 Finally, banks must maintain adequate 
capital to shield themselves, the fi nancial markets and the broader 
economy from the risks of future bank failures caused by any future 
disruptions to their operations and soundness. The reforms are now 
underway to the Basel II measures of regulatory capital for banks 
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need to recognise the need to map the risks of an individual bank’s 
securitisation activities and their holdings of complex securitised 
obligations into hard form capital requirements that are imple-
mented and enforced. This will require regulators and supervisors 
to be more aware of and vigilant to the uses of securitisation as a 
fi nancing technique as well as to its abuses.
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